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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

***ISRAEL***

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# Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL

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3 February 1993

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## International Affairs

### Analysis of Butrus-Ghali Report, Resolution 681

TA2701154293 Tel Aviv HADASHOT

in Hebrew 27 Jan 93 p 3

[Text] UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali saved the surprise for the sixth page of the report he submitted to the Security Council yesterday. Therein appears that not-new idea to dispatch a UN force to monitor Israeli activities in the occupied territories. Butrus-Ghali is not bringing this as a suggestion. He only says, in the report, that he intends to initiate talks with the Israeli authorities regarding the creation of a "UN inspection apparatus." Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres hastened yesterday to announce that Israel opposes the idea.

Still, it must be recalled that this is not a new proposal. It was first raised in 1990, in the wake of the Temple Mount incident. Then UN Undersecretary Jean-Claude Aimee was sent to Israel and, at the conclusion of his trip, he relayed a harsh report to then UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. In the wake of the report, Security Council Resolution 681 was passed on the dispatch of an inspection force to Israel. In his report, Butrus-Ghali quotes the clause of Resolution 681, which relates to the UN inspection force.

Israel then objected to the sending of the UN force and the result was that UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Work Agency] officers served in the capacity of the U.S. supervisory force. In instances when there are incidents between the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] and residents of the territories, an UNRWA ambulance appears. Sometimes they observe events from the sidelines. Occasionally, they are stuck at the actual scene of the incident and force IDF officers to insistently request that they leave the site, charging that their appearance there heats up the atmosphere.

The proposal to send a UN inspection force is consistent with the demand to "protect the Palestinians," which is being raised by Palestinians from atop every available international platform. The PLO is demanding that the Israeli mandate in the territories be caused to lapse. The establishment of an international UN force, which would be positioned between Israel and the Palestinians, would respond to this demand.

The Israeli position is grounded in international law. It is therein determined that the only party responsible for the situation in the occupied territories is the occupying power. This is fixed in the Geneva Convention. This is one of the sections in the charter for which Israel will fight intensely.

## Regional Affairs

### Tunnel for Weapons Smuggling in Rafiah Described

93AE0191A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew  
11 Dec 92 pp 2-4

[Article by Ariella Ringel-Hoffman: "The Tunnel"]

[Text] Intelligence findings that accumulated at the beginning of October among related parties led to an inevitable

conclusion: An active tunnel passes from the Egyptian Rafiah through the Rafiah under Israeli rule. The question was how, and with what speed it could be exposed. On the 18th of that month, the deputy commander of the border unit called upon Alex Beck, 40, from the Institute for Oil and Geophysical Research. Accompanied by military personnel, Beck and a crew went up the patrol road along the border. To the incredulous eyes of the local residents, they dragged after them a red plastic device attached to a commercial Volkswagen. The vehicle traveled at a speed of some 15 kilometers per hour, going up and down the same three-kilometer path that had been marked by the army. At approximately 2:00 p.m., they returned the equipment to the car, leaving behind them three marked sites. Under one of them, they estimated, passed the tunnel they were looking for.

Two weeks later, on November 1, the officer called Beck once again. Two of the places that you marked, he told him, match the intelligence findings that have accumulated here over the past week. I want you to come back again, he told him.

The institute personnel arrived the next morning. On the road, along a road hundreds of meters long, a huge bulldozer that had been brought to the site by the IDF [Israel Defense Force] was already at work. It moved heavily and slowly, digging a tunnel several meters deep. The need to expose the tunnel quickly motivated the commander in the field to employ all possible means simultaneously. The hope was that the channel that the tractor dug would expose the tunnel.

Beck asked for time. Give me two hours, he told them, to precisely mark the location of the tunnels within a few meters. Two hours later, he proposed two sites. The dig of the second site that he marked exposed a tunnel—at least 100 meters in length and 3.5 meters deep—connecting the two parts of the city. It was well built, professional. Its sides were covered with logs attached to one another throughout the length of the tunnel. A rope attached to a small car served to transfer goods along it. Drugs, clothing, food, and money passed through this tunnel. So did weapons, bullets, explosives, and, in emergencies, wanted persons who had been chased for long periods of time by the security forces, members of the cells who had been required to cross the border and to return to their places.

Several hours after the discovery, the army sent a cement machine to the site and poured in a tremendous quantity of material. The rumor made the rounds in Rafiah: Another tunnel had been discovered and closed up by the army.

The army has exposed four tunnels over the past five years in Rafiah, during the course of the intifadah. This is an unofficial number used by senior officers serving there. Everyone there is certain that it is not really indicative of the number of tunnels dug and operated there. The locals speak of double or triple that number of tunnels, and it is clear to everyone that while one tunnel is being searched

for, the next tunnels are being dug. All of the tunnels started on the Israeli side, crossed the no-man's land underneath the security fence (the road passing between the Israeli fence and the Egyptian fence) and came up on the other side. Several dozen meters in length, not deep, and under the noses of the security forces of both sides.

They say in Rafiah that the first tunnel was dug in 1982, upon the division of the city between Egypt and Israel. They say there that the construction continued for a year and a half, and it was the largest tunnel that had been dug and exposed to date. A minivan could have passed through there, they say; of course, it is very likely that this is an exaggeration.

According to the local residents, the tunnels were dug by the Zo'arov family, one of the more wealthy families in Rafiah. The family conducted its smuggling business in it, at the same time fulfilling senior positions in the municipality. In 1982, for example, Sheikh Shahta Zo'arov was the mayor of Rafiah, and his deputy was another member of the family named Hilbi Zo'arov. Sheikh Zo'arov, by the way, was forced in 1982 to part from an oil press and an ice factory that he owned, as the border transferred them to the Egyptian side. The tunnel served the people of Rafiah for approximately three years. It was exposed in December 1987. It is claimed in Rafiah that this was because of informing. Someone marked a troublesome area for the military personnel. The local residents say that a small child, who did not understand what this was about, showed the security forces the precise place.

One of the members of the Zo'arov family was arrested then. He was released in 1991. In March 1990, another tunnel was exposed. According to the indictment filed against the diggers, Suleiman Sha'ar, Rabi'a Kadar, and Suleiman Abu Zanhav, it was intended to smuggle weapons, money, and goods, and to serve as a means of smuggling wanted persons and members of the shock committees. It further became evident that this tunnel, which was several dozen meters long, split later on and concluded in several exits on the Egyptian side.

Rafiah under Israeli rule is the fighting Palestine of the Gaza Strip. In this city, which received loud attention from the press this week with the pictures of the execution of a person whom they defined as a collaborator with Israel, the revolutionary reserves of the entire Gaza Strip are growing. The murderer and the murder victim are both members of well-known families in town, with a long history of internal wars, now channelled to the struggle against Israel. Wanted members of the Fatah and the Islamic movements, considered the most difficult, come from the crowded blocks of the refugee camps of Rafiah, numbered in ascending order. The most violent demonstrations that have taken place recently have occurred there. The distant memory that reservists have from past years of the beach and a few palm trees has not been indicative of the city for a long time. In military circles, it is currently considered no less dangerous to the troops, and perhaps more so, than Jenin in the West Bank.

Military personnel, who have a hard time explaining the phenomenon, say that this is due to a combination of several factors: the proximity to the border, and the distance from the city of Gaza and from the primary Israeli military presence. This is the only place along the borders of Israel where local residents live right next to the fence. The thing that was not allowed on the borders of Jordan and Lebanon is happening in Rafiah. The local residents have a double enemy, and hatred of the authorities crosses the borders. The Egyptian security forces, which the local residents call al-yAman al-Markazi [expansion not given] are hated no less than the Israeli GSS [General Security Services]. Egyptian security is concentrated mainly in the Canada refugee camp. The residents of Rafiah claim that its people are difficult, cruel and without mercy.

On April 26, 1982, pursuant to the decisions made at Camp David, the division of the city was terminated. The Israeli army pulled wires along the road and lowered the Israeli flag from the top of the flagpost with a nervous shake. The troops said let them be healthy and may we not need to return here. On the Egyptian side, in the evening hours of the same day, a small party took place. A runner, bringing a torch from Cairo, was welcomed in a well-fenced tent, fireworks drew the Egyptian flag in the sky, and, in between, a few stones flew from the Egyptian side toward troops on the Israeli side. Joy, in any case, did not flood the city there, either.

Approximately 95 thousand people now reside in Israeli Rafiah. A flat, dejected city, devoid of charm although with a history of approximately 5,000 years, it is entirely lacking in significance in the daily lives of its citizens. Over sixty percent of the residents are refugees from the War of Independence, among those who signal their cities of origin with a yellow, nicotine-stained finger—Ashkelon, Yavneh, Ashdod, Jaffa, Ramleh, Lod. And at the end of 15 years of occupation, even those who returned to Egypt identified themselves as Palestinians.

For the first few years after the division, a relatively high standard of living was still maintained. The residents earned their main income by intensive smuggling, knowing to exploit the price differentials between the two countries. A vigorous traffic of goods made its way along the Rafiah el-Arish road. Subsidized Israeli oil went to Egypt, cheap Egyptian sardines were sent to Israel. Restaurant owners in Tel Aviv, who knew a word or two of Arabic, imported lobsters from Rafiah for a tenth of the market price in central Israel. When a videocassette recorder cost approximately 2,000 dollars in Israel, it could be had in Rafiah for 300 dollars.

Spare automobile parts from the Egyptian side were also imported. In one of the captures, the army collected a huge package of Peugeot hood ornaments, a pile of lions on their hind legs, and the number 504. The package, incidentally, was tossed over the border fence. When grenades began to be thrown over the fence at IDF patrols passing below, the fence was made higher, and the smuggling of goods was transferred to the underground channels. Once, on the Jordan bridges, a huge sum of one million Egyptian pounds was caught; it had been smuggled via Rafiah by

moneychangers, who attempted to gain the existing rate differentials in Jordan. This money made its way through the tunnel.

The local residents say that the diggers of the tunnels in the town of Rafiah are sons of families who, for decades, have specialized in digging water wells, cesspools, and drainage canals. Abu-Hulad, they call them in town, the moles. What a modern drill submerging to a depth of several meters and a diameter of between half a meter and a meter can do, the local diggers accomplish with the help of shovels, buckets sewn from automobile tires, and a donkey to pull up the full baskets.

From a geological perspective, Rafiah sits between loess and sand. In its southern area, a thick layer of approximately two meters of loess soil can be found. Underneath is a clay layer extending to a depth of at least eight meters. The clay layer is very plastic and enables comfortable and relatively easy digging. At the same time, it maintains the arched structure of the tunnel, without fear that the walls and ceiling will collapse.

Continuing to the northwest, along the border, and approaching the beach, the layers become more and more sandy. Even though it is easier to dig there, the fragility of the material makes it necessary for the diggers to side the tunnel and the ceiling, just the way the latest tunnel was found. There is a dense siding of logs, laid alongside one another. According to residents of Rafiah, the digging lasts for approximately one year. The work is usually done by no more than two or three people. The soil removed from the tunnel under construction is distributed throughout the area. They make sure to get rid of every sign that could indicate underground activity.

Beck, the geophysicist, says that this reflects high professional ability, manifested by the choice of location, familiarity and correct use of the structure of the land, the ability to locate the soft layer for digging (on top of which is a relatively hard layer which is supposed to prevent collapse), navigating underground, maintaining the same level, and arriving at the planned exit point. This professionalism is manifested by the ability to exist at a depth of several meters, in a dark medium with little oxygen, while utilizing simple means. Defense experts do not doubt that these tunnels constitute one of the primary means of smuggling weapons, ammunition, and people in the territories.

The effort to expose the tunnels led to the connection between the army and the geophysical institute. The initial connection was made two and a half years before the last discovery. An assessment made by the Institute for the Southern Command on a totally different subject led its engineering officer to return to the institute when efforts to expose the tunnels became more and more urgent. The feeling was that these tunnels being built and functioning several meters underground presented an increasingly grave security risk.

In the midst of the Gulf war, a local informer led the military personnel to the opening of a pit that had been dug under a dense thorn hedge. The trench was closed by a tin

cover which had been fit to the size of the opening and covered with dirt. With the entrance exposed, a vertical pit seven meters deep was discovered, from which the horizontal digging began. The military personnel called upon the researchers from the institute. They intended to allow them to study the issue from the exposed tunnel. When they arrived at the site, they discovered that five meters from the trench, a sophisticated bulldozer recruited for the discovery task by the army was already at work. Several hours later, the tunnel was exposed. The diggers found a classic arched tunnel. Its builders knew how to take advantage of the structure of the local land, and had managed to mine a tunnel without using supports along the sides.

Several dozen meters from the exposed opening, the researchers from the institute tried to locate the continuing line. The method they used proved to be inefficient, very expensive, and slow. During a day's work, they were able to map only about 100 meters. Processing the data continued for several more days. Only then did the staff return to the site and manage to locate the continuation of the tunnel.

Verification exposed an additional fact that had been previously unknown to the searchers. For test purposes, they rolled a colored smoke grenade into the dig. The red smoke not only floated out of the opening of the tunnel, but also out of air openings that had been dug along it. One was located exactly underneath the feet of an Egyptian soldier who stood on the other side of the border curiously following the activity. When he noticed the smoke under his feet, he jumped in fear.

Ten months later, additional searches for a tunnel ended in tragedy. An IDF soldier accompanying the search staff entered a dig that tractor drivers were performing on the site. The sides of the dig collapsed, burying him beneath it. The soldier was killed. The army hurried to fill the tunnel that had been exposed there and to leave the search site. The rumor about the death of the soldier, like other rumors arriving from the border, quickly made the rounds of the entire town. A year and a half later, the locals can repeat the facts of the case with great precision.

The findings that have been accumulated to date indicate that each tunnel begins with a trench descending for some depth. The horizontal digging comes out of the same trench. The openings of the tunnel can therefore be hidden with great ease, making it particularly difficult to expose them. A tunnel opening of this kind can be located within a grid of thorns, in the yard of a home, or in the middle of an orange grove. The exit openings are similarly camouflaged on the Egyptian side.

Hence, the discovery technique is based upon intelligence—a delicate term for information which comes mainly from collaborators—and, later, identification of the exact location of the tunnel with the aid of a radar instrument.

Contrary to the seismic method of discovery that the institute personnel utilized two years ago during the initial searches, the most recent discovery was aided by a sophisticated radar instrument which was imported into Israel

approximately six months ago. The instrument, which works on the transmittal and reception of electromagnetic waves, can map the layers in a test site to a depth of 30 meters. The geophysical personnel can also identify unusual phenomena in the test site from the picture on the colored screen—for example, air spaces in underground layers. This is, incidentally, an advanced model of the instrument which was developed approximately 20 years ago in the United States and which was originally designed to measure the thickness of ice in Alaska. It served the U.S. Army in locating tunnels that had been dug by the Viet Cong, connecting North and South Vietnam.

In other words, this is a kind of ultrasound of the depths of the earth. The manner in which it was utilized in Rafiah took advantage of its imaging capability, which was basically intended for civilian applications such as interpreting underground layers in the processes of planning and repairing roads, constructing bridges, locating underground pollutants which are endangering sea water, mapping archeological sites, etc.

Approximately one year ago, close to the commencement of the talks in Madrid, the ocean along the Rafiah beach expelled a number of bodies. Examination of the bodies revealed that these were members of a Fatah cell who had fled Rafiah and later returned. In their things were found written instructions for a mass attack in central Israel. This was in mid-winter. It turns out that the members of the cell were lowered from a boat close to the shore, and they drowned in the stormy sea. The case came up in a recent discussion about the tunnels that took place in the military. The fact that the members of the cells had to cross the stormy sea convinced some of those present that the tunnels could not be passed by people.

I would not rely upon this assumption, said a member of the military who is very familiar with the matter. A tunnel built by a person is also passed through by a person, and the air openings that were found throughout the tunnel, like the extremely massive supports that were discovered within it, indicate that it is possible for people, as well as goods, drugs, or money, to pass through. And weapons, of course. Even if it is possible to purchase a Kalashnikov in the territories for 1500 dollars, he says, a relatively inexpensive price, the fact that the use of live weapons has increased of late perhaps indicates extensive use of tunnels—a simple means of smuggling weapons and explosives.

As of now—after the exposure of four tunnels and with whatever number of tunnels have not been exposed—the army has still not formulated an efficient policy for searching for tunnels, according to conversations on the site. Retrospective examination reveals that intelligence information led to two of the tunnels. One was exposed by coincidence. An angle iron that stood out on the intrusion tracking dirt road aroused the suspicion of the tracker, and further examination revealed that this was a primitive means of navigation used by the diggers, which was supposed to mark the point that they had reached underneath the ground. The tractor later exposed the tunnel. The last tunnel was marked by the radar instrument that was

brought to the site by the researchers from the geophysical institute. In the meantime, in the army, like in Rafiah, it is estimated that a new tunnel is already in use.

## Internal Affairs

### Relations Between Arab MKs, Constituents

93AE0233B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
30 Dec 92 p B2

[Article by Yerah Tal: "Intended for Arab Ears"; first paragraph is YEDI'OT AHARONOT introduction]

[Text] Tawfiq Zi'ad and Hashim Mahamid, two very different Israeli Arab politicians, do not hesitate to tell their constituents what they find out, which is felt to be a crossing of red lines by Jewish society and the Knesset.

The recent incidents involving the two MK's [members of Knesset] from Hadash, Hashim Mahamid and Tawfiq Zi'ad, show that, unlike the past, the consideration that guides Arab public figures today in their pronouncements and in their actions is not how their words will be received in the Jewish community, but what impression they will leave with their Arab constituents. There are those who attribute MK Ziad's outbreak the day before yesterday at the Knesset rostrum and MK Mahamid's pronouncements last week at a conference in Gaza on behalf of the intifadah struggle, to the increasing frustration of Israeli Arab public figures with the expulsion of the 415, which they call "the first transfer." The Arab lists were widely expected to gain in status following the last elections, which left them with the political swing vote. But their people are increasingly disgruntled as they see Rabin constantly trying to broaden his government's parliamentary base in order not to have to rely on the Arab MK's.

Ziyad and Mahamid, who differ in background and temperament, clearly represent two generations in Israeli-Arab politics. Ziyad, 63, has a high school education. Mahamid, 47, is an educated man who finished a master's in education at Tel Aviv University and started work on a doctorate in political psychology. Before coming to the Knesset, was at the end of the 12th Knesset session, due to changes in the list carried out by decision of the Hadash council requiring the resignation of Vilner and Tubi, he was known as a public figure who worked for Jewish-Arab coexistence. His master's thesis dealt with stereotypes, and he says he knows the subject well, both from an academic and a practical point of view, as an Arab citizen in Israel.

Mahamid was elected head of the Umm-al-Fahm council in 1983 (before the declaration of the settlement as a city) and lost the mayoralty to the Islamic Movement in the 1989 elections. In interviews with him, he stresses that he is not a communist.

Mahamid was invited to join Hadash when that party was looking for a candidate to run for the chairmanship of the Umm-al-Fahm council who did not carry the communist label, in order to win the votes of the religious circles. Indeed, in the local elections Hadash viewed him as electoral property. In the 11th Knesset elections there were

only about 2,000 votes between him and a Knesset seat. After he came to the 12th Knesset, he gained renown when he closed his city to Me'ir Kahane and his people, and when he announced that he would not obey the law initiated by former Likud MK Me'ir Kohen-Avidov requiring that the national flag be flown atop every public building in Israel. Yitzhaq Peretz, then minister of the Interior from SHAS [Sephardi Torah Guardians], imposed a religious ban on the 1985 ceremony declaring Umm-al-Fahm a city, in protest of the things Mahamid had said, which Peretz understood to be incitement against the State and against the IDF [Israel Defense Forces].

The strengthening of the Islamic movement impelled Mahamid to sharpen his pronouncements in an attempt not to lose public support. In an interview with AL ITIHAD, the party journal, on the morning of the landing of the Scud missiles in Israel, Mahamid said that, by invading Kuwait, Saddam Husayn had returned the glory of the Muslim tradition to the Arab nation. According to him, he felt appreciation for Saddam Husayn.

In June of 1991 Mahamid was investigated by the national unit for criminal investigation within the police department on the suspicion that he had committed the crime of supporting a hostile organization and on suspicion of incitement to revolution. This followed remarks that he made on 9 November 1990 in a mourning procession held in Umm-al-Fahm a day after the killing on the Temple Mount, similar to what he had said at a conference in Gaza—that the struggle of the Arabs would continue until the establishment of a Palestinian state, whose capital would be in Jerusalem. Then, too, Mahamid claimed that he was misunderstood. At his investigation he said that he spoke in Arabic and used the term "al-Quds al-Sharqiyah," which means East Jerusalem. When the students at Al-Najah University barricaded themselves in July 1992, he rushed to the college with Walid Sadiq and 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah to mediate.

In this Knesset at Labor's initiative, he was brought into the State Review Committee, but the committee chairman, Dan Tikhon, sought to prevent him from participating in sessions where privileged material would be discussed. Mahamid himself asked for an Arab Knesset member in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and argued that preventing Arab membership in that committee indicated national discrimination. Lately he has met several times with PLO people and with 'Arafat, and following that, Likud MK's initiated an appeal to the Committee of the Knesset to revoke his immunity. But it seems that the final abolition of the law preventing meetings with the PLO, an abolition that has already passed its preliminary reading, will also nullify this initiative. Israeli Arab circles complain that since he was elected to the Knesset, he spends more time in the territories than in the Arab villages in Israel.

Mahamid is considered in right-wing circles as a much more moderate politician than Ziyad. Ziyad has been serving for about 17 years as mayor of the city of Nazareth and has been a member of the Knesset since 1974. In the

Arab states and in the Palestinian diaspora he is well-known as one of the outstanding "poets of the opposition." His poems do not want for strong language, and following the criticism leveled against Emile Habibi, who was a member of his party, for Ziyad's support of Saddam Husayn, Ziyad published a poem in AL-ITTIHAD laced with vilifying name calling directed at Habibi. In the poem Habibi was called "weak in character and in faith" and an "apostate." Other poems dealt with issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As far back as November 1974 MK Amnon Lin of Likud submitted a complaint to the Committee of the Knesset against Ziyad for a poem he published, "The Great Crossing," in which he glorified the crossing of the canal by the Egyptians in the Yom Kippur War. But Ziyad is not limited to the written word and is considered a speaker in great demand.

His sharp pronouncements led in the past to a request that he be stripped of his Knesset immunity because of a speech that he gave in 1985 in the al-Ibrahimiyyah Islamic College in East Jerusalem in a memorial ceremony for Fahd Qawasmeh, that was interpreted as incitement against the State. His immunity was not removed at that time, on the strength of a single vote, because of Labor opposition. In June 1980 he called Israeli policymakers "criminals and beasts," and at a Palestinian conference in the United States in December 1986 he said that "the biggest terrorist in the Middle East is the Israeli Government."

Ziyad, who has no qualms about skewering his opponents, does not take criticism well from his colleagues, so that, for example, in January 1987 he brought about the expulsion from the party of one of the senior Raqah activists, Saliba Khumays, and also because Khumays had criticized Ziyad in an article in AL-SINNARAH for the statue of the "Tent of Hagar" that the municipality of Nazareth ordered without a bid. In July 1987 Ziyad called Likud MK Amal Nas-al-Din a "traitor" and the latter responded by calling Ziyad names. The fisticuffs that almost developed between the two of them were squashed by Dov Ben-Amir.

His harsh record in the Knesset is nothing new. On 20 October 1987 Ziyad was removed from the speaker's rostrum by the Knesset's three sergeants at arms upon instructions from session chairman Dan Tikhon after he violated the rules and uttered callous remarks during the discussion of the events at al-Aqsa mosque. In March 1988 NRP [National Religious Party] MK Hayim Druerman asked the government's legal counsel Yosef Harish to consider trying Ziyad for incitement in the Knesset speech in which he said that the uprising in the territories was the real peace initiative, and not the Shultz initiative.

On the eve of the last Knesset elections he managed to trip up his opponents in Hadash and brought about the resignation of Hashim Mahamid from the top of the list, leaving him in first place. Despite the criticism leveled against him even at home, he is considered by many in his political circle to be electoral property. A charismatic politician and a clever speaker, he is described in the Arab community in Israel as a man who cannot shut up and who is always picking a fight. A man who is not afraid of

anyone or anything. At times he represents the prototypical popular leader who cannot be bought off by the establishment. If he wins the contest for the job of general secretary of his party, which takes place next month, he will wear three hats in Hadash—general secretary of the party, MK, and mayor.

**Decisionmaking Process in Deportation Explained**  
 93AE0232D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
 in Hebrew 20 Dec 92 pp 4,5

[Articles by Orli Azolai Kin: "Rabin 'Sold' Every Minister a Different Story"]

[Text]

**Political**

A short while before the government session Wednesday, Yitzhak Rabin summoned his judicial ministers to his office, closed the door, and announced that they were about to hear a "very secret matter": the deportation of the Hamas people. Present were Amon Rubinshtayn, Mose Shahal, Shulamit Aloni, and Haim Rimon.

Rabin reviewed the security situation briefly and told the participants that the intelligence information he had received indicated that the Hamas people were preparing, in the near future, to murder policemen and soldiers. "We are going to remove the Hamas leaders and the agitators," Rabin told those present, without specifying the number of deportees.

"It was clear to us that it was a matter of isolated deportations," one of the participants in the meeting related last night; "they were talking about giving them flight tickets. They were talking about furnishing them with cash and flying them to any European country that would be willing to take them in."

Why did you not ask how many they were talking about?

"Because of that, some of us have not slept for three days now. There was trust. But now it has become clear that you have to ask even about things that are self-understood."

A source close to Rabin confirmed that, indeed, there was talk of the deportees getting flight tickets to Europe, but "only on condition that they ask for them." They did not ask and obviously did not get them. At that same session the Meretz minister asked Rabin for a "gesture for peace." Rabin was not enthusiastic. "Deporting and making gestures do not go well together," he explained, and promised to talk with Washington.

**Liba'i Holds Out**

Justice Minister David Liba'i arrived 10 minutes before the government session began. He entered the room, in which the Minister of Police Moshe Shahal and the government's legal adviser Yosef Harish were sitting. They both told him that unanimous agreement had already been reached on deportation, and even the Meretz ministers were in agreement. Liba'i, too, was not given any numbers, and he did not know how many deportees were involved. Harish presented him with a draft containing but a single

paragraph: "In light of the emergency situation the army commanders agree to carry out the orders for removal of the agitators for a period not to exceed two years." Liba'i said that he opposed the expulsion. Then an argument broke out between Harish and Liba'i.

The Justice Minister demanded an additional paragraph stating that those expelled could appeal within 60 days to a special committee. Harish went to consult with Rabin; he returned and added the paragraph.

Liba'i understood that Harish was preparing "a decision to circumvent the High Court of Justice." Since the government takes its legal counsel from the legal adviser, the justice minister's status is like that of any other minister. Liba'i phoned the state prosecutor, Dorit Beinisch, and heard that she also opposed the kidnapping. Liba'i told Rabin that he would abstain from voting.

When the government session began, Rabin presented the developments, announced the deportation and did not specify numbers. The Housing Minister Binyamin ben-Eli'ezer asked for permission to speak: "I propose that we deport at least 300 Hamas people and also decide to close the mosques, because that is where the agitation comes from."

**Aloni Attacks**

Shulamit Aloni attacked him: "We are not talking at all about those kinds of numbers; do not even dare to imagine that large a quantity of deportees."

The Meretz ministers were angry at Liba'i for abstaining. They understood that they were not being told the whole truth and were only told what they wanted to hear. "We have to demonstrate unity and vote as one," the Meretz people told Liba'i, who responded: "I am not ready to join the chorus."

The government session ended. The Meretz ministers were astounded when they heard afterward in the media that they were talking about 415 deportees. "I do not want to talk and do not force me to," Aloni said last night when asked if she felt deceived.

Amnon Rubinshtayn said that he supported the decision. He explained that he was presented with "awful alternatives": to completely stop all private vehicular traffic in the territories, to try to enact the death penalty in the Knesset, to blow up houses again, and to close the mosques. "All those alternatives were distasteful to my world view so I did not support them. I had no idea they were talking about hundreds," the minister said.

The Meretz ministers also were up in arms over the fact that they were not told in advance who was to be deported. "They told us the security situation was grave, that there was information about gangs ready to carry out strikes, and in the end they deported teachers and spiritual leaders," the Meretz ministers said last night and strongly criticized the fact that the action was carried out in haste, without planning, which caused a chain of blunders such as, for example, the decision to return 30 of the deportees from the border. "They told us they made a mistake. What



would have happened if they had successfully transported them across the border? Would they have said: 'Sorry, we made a mistake'?"

Other government ministers criticized the action last night: The government essentially tried to appease public opinion and did not check the issue out seriously and in depth. The world's reactions were not foreseen, nor the ferment in the territories or the cessation of the peace talks. "The government banged its head against the wall," a number of minister said.

#### **Fu'ad Explains**

Binyamin (Fu'ad) ben-Eli'ezer, a member of the diplomatic-security cabinet and one of the strong supporters of deportation said yesterday: "At the government level there was no check of the possible scenarios, and we did not foresee that it would end this way."

Was there a complication here?

"In the government no one forecast such a complication. There was a decision to send the deportees across the border."

Was it a hasty decision?

"Under the circumstances we made the most correct decision. We had to take a drastic step that would shake up Hamas. Now they know what our red lines are. The moderate Palestinians are satisfied with our decision."

What will happen now to the deportees?

Let them sit on the border, let them set up tents and even mosques for themselves. In a little while they will disappear from there.

#### **Diplomatic**

Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin made the decision to punish Hamas, and in a big way, last Sunday morning at a government session when the report arrived of the kidnapping of policeman Nissim Toledano.

Rabin still did not know at the time what the scope of the reaction would be, but, according to his confidants, he immediately understood that the government's list of priorities would change completely: He would have to prove to the nation that the government could protect its residents.

#### **Sunday: Consultations**

After the conclusion of the session, Rabin talked with Minister of Police Moshe Shahal. The two agreed that immediately after Shahal returned from visiting Toledano's family in Lod, the senior members of the security establishment would gather in the prime minister's office: the chief of staff, his deputy, the chief of the Shin Bet, the police commissioner, the governor of the prison service and a number of other IDF [Israel Defense Forces] officers.

In the hours remaining before the consultation, Rabin received reports from the field and consolidated a program

of action. The reaction, so he thought, had to be particularly painful: Likewise, he had to find a way to "sell it" to the problematic coalition partners—the Meretz ministers.

At the consultation two decisions were made: to appeal to Shaykh Yasin to call publicly upon the kidnappers not to hurt Toledano and to expand and deepen the search for the policeman. Further consultation was also set up, later at night.

Only in the second consultation, held in Rabin's office at the Defense Ministry in the government compound, did the question arise of the reaction against Hamas. The participants in the discussion believed that Toledano's kidnappers would kill him. The chief of staff and the minister of police suggested deporting the Hamas leaders.

Rabin was dubious: "What value is there to that idea if the High Court of Justice does not even let us destroy a house and if we have to wait 13 months for court approval?" The chief of staff argued that they had to find a "loophole" in the law to allow the deportation.

Baraq explained that Hamas had succeeded in building up an extensive organizational infrastructure in the territories. He warned that if a solution was not found to bring about the dismantling of Hamas, the kidnapping of Toledano would not be the last.

#### **Tuesday: The Decision**

The decision for deportation came to fruition after Toledano's body was found on noon Tuesday. Rabin and the members of his narrow forum came to the firm conclusion that there was no way out other than deportation.

Shahal, a lawyer by training, prepared a six-point document for Rabin. The suggestion to deport the leaders of Hamas appeared in all of them. One suggestion spoke of deportation for six months, another, of an unlimited period of removal.

The document was presented to Rabin on Wednesday morning. In consultation with the chief of staff, the chief military prosecutor and Rabin's military secretary, Brig. Gen. 'Azri'el Nebo (who, it was announced at the end of the week, would be replaced by Gen. Dani Yatom), it was decided to deport the Hamas leaders.

Now the decision had to be passed by the government. The expected opponents were the "lawyers" and/or the "leftists": the minister of justice, David Liba'i; the minister of energy, Amnon Rubinshtayn; the minister of education, Shulamit Aloni; the minister of economics, Shim'on Shitrit; and the government's legal advisor, Yosef Harish.

#### **Wednesday: Persuasion**

Rabin went to work drumming up support. He "sold" each minister the idea of deportation, using excuses tailored to the particular listener. The first to be summoned for a discussion was Rubinshtayn, in a kind of gesture of respect, before the government session.

The flattered Rubinshtayn supported the deportation and contributed a rider to the decision: The deportees would be able to appeal to the High Court of Justice after the deportation. Liba'i was also called in for the early consultation. When he arrived (late, because of traffic jams), he also supported the deportation.

The minutes of that consultation were transcribed into a protocol by Lt. Col. Shim'on Hefetz, who was filling in for the military secretary. According to that protocol Liba'i advised Rabin to send large military forces into the Gaza Strip, including tanks and APC's, in reaction to Hamas's murderous deeds.

Rabin presented Aloni with the alternatives to deportation: blowing up houses, the death penalty, and a change in the instructions for opening fire. The minister, having no choice, preferred deportation. Aloni wanted to know how many deportees were involved. She was told that the numbers were not yet final and that it was matter of "several tens."

Absorption Minister Ya'ir Tzeven was told that "the deportation would strengthen the moderates among the Palestinians and strengthen the prospect of reaching a settlement with them." At the end of the week Tzeven confessed: "I was convinced that the expulsion would be a real contribution to our ability to talk with the moderate camp in the PLO."

The "handling" of Shitrit was entrusted to the general manager of the prime minister's office, Shim'on Shabes. Then it was Harish's turn. The adviser backed the idea and even put his stamp on the decision when he suggested the exact formulation of the punishment: "temporary expulsion for the sake of removal." From the moment the "legal" ministers (Shahal, Liba'i, Aloni, and Shitrit) were convinced that the step was vital, there was no longer any problem in getting an almost unanimous decision in the government for the deportation.

### Wednesday Night: Complications

The first problem in implementation occurred on Wednesday night around 2000 in the evening. The lawyers for 17 of the deportees appealed to the High Court of Justice. In Rabin's office it was decided to order the immediate removal of the 17 in whose name the appeal was submitted from the buses, which were making their way to Lebanon, and to continue with the deportation as planned.

Rabin asked for Shahal, who had headed off to Haifa, to be brought to him. The call reached the minister in the vicinity of Caesarea, and he hurried back to Tel Aviv. The tension around Rabin grew, especially against the backdrop of fear of more court appeals by representatives of the deportees.

And that, in fact, happened. Around 0200 Judge Baraq ordered the deportation halted. Rabin asked the chief of staff where the buses were. The reply was that the deportees were still in Metula, prior to crossing the border. If so, Rabin said, we have to stop the process immediately and obey the instruction of the High Court of Justice.

### Problems

- Before the decision was made for the deportation, no simulation was conducted of possible scenarios. The government did not consult the national security team, headed by Haim Asa. The entire team, whose job, in fact, it is to handle such crises, was left out of the picture.
- According to ministers involved in planning the deportation, the IDF did not act quickly enough in gathering up the deportees and moving them across the border. That allowed their lawyers to block implementation of the deportation via an appeal to the High Court of Justice.
- The prime minister and the ministers did not foresee the absolute refusal of the state prosecutor to represent the government before the judges of the High Court of Justice.
- Nor did they foresee the firm reaction of the Lebanese Government, which, unlike before, was unwilling to allow the deportees to enter its territory.

### Education of Deportees Described

93AE0234B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
21 Dec 92 p B2

[Article by Dani Rubinstein: "They Were All Deported, Except for the Ones Who Carried Out the Strikes"]

[Text] Four hundred and fifteen people is the exact number of Hamas activists expelled from Israel last week, according to counts made by Arab editorial offices in East Jerusalem. Most of them (252) are from the West Bank and the rest (163) are from the Gaza Strip. About half of the deportees worked in Muslim religious institutions in the territories. Nevertheless the deportees do not include members of the military arm of Hamas or of the Islamic Jihad movement, some of whom are being sought and are hiding from the security forces while others, whose identities are unknown, work in the underground. Still, even in East Jerusalem, the feeling is that the deportees are the organizational skeleton of the Hamas movement.

Those among them who worked in the religious institutions on the West Bank and in Gaza include imams of mosques, preachers, teachers in the colleges and religious schools, Shari'ah court workers and officials of the Muslim Waqf. Among them is a large group of young people serving as emissaries to strengthen the hold of religion. They go to the villages, the refugee camps, and the urban neighborhoods and try to persuade the residents to uphold the commandments of Islam with dedication—to pray five times a day, to be sure to fast on Ramadan, to contribute to the charitable committees (Zakat) located in every region, to make pilgrimages to Mecca, and to uphold the integrity of their faith.

The Hamas movement nurtured these young people, who, in their struggle against the selling of alcoholic beverages and the use of drugs and prostitution, did not disdain violence. Among other things, they set fire to buses that ferried young boys and girls on coed tours, attacked women and girls who went about without head coverings

(especially in Gaza), and prevented the hiring of bands and belly dancers for weddings. They attacked gambling casinos and billiard parlors and beat up and even murdered distributors of pornographic booklets and tapes.

There are also deportees who were involved in another type of activity. There are about 30 lecturers with academic degrees who teach in the Muslim universities, especially in Gaza and Hebron, and 20 doctors and five engineers. They assisted in establishing a network of educational and welfare institutions for the Islamic movement, including infirmaries, kindergartens, kitchens for the needy and institutions that provide assistance to families of detainees, the handicapped and orphans.

Relative to the size of the population, the largest number of deportees is from the city of Gaza. Among the second-largest group are 78 deportees from the Hebron district, almost all of them from the city itself. Twenty of the Hebron deportees are teachers in the city's Muslim college, which was the first institution of higher learning set up with financial assistance from the Israeli government in the early 1970s. In contrast to deportees from other cities in the territories, the large number of old-line blueblood family members is striking—five members of the al-Qawasmī family, three members of the al-Natshah family, three members of the al-Ja'bari family, three members of the Nasr-al-Din family and still others from the al-Muhtasah, al-Tamimi, al-Nijazi, and Salhab families.

It must also be pointed out that the overwhelming majority of the deportees are residents of the cities and large towns in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank, while a minority come from the small villages and refugee camps. It seems that the percentage of deportees who are children of refugee families is lower than their ratio within the population; loyalty to the PLO is still particularly strong among the refugees.

On the other hand the deportee members of Islamic Jihad, the ones who are most radical in their demands for violent action against Israel and the ones who stress nationalism more than religion, number only a few tens (50 to 60). Their numbers are relatively large among the deportees from Bethlehem.

The well-known personages among the deportees are Dr. Mahmud al-Zahhar from Gaza, the chief spokesman for the Hamas movement; and 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Rantisi, a lecturer in Gaza's Muslim college. The most senior of the deportees from the West Bank is Shaykh Hamid al-Bitawi from Tulkarm, known for his sermons in the al-Aqsa mosque. Deported from Nabulus, among others, was Hajj 'Adil Ya'ish, a wealthy businessman who serves as head of the Muslim charity committees; the imam Mahir Harraz, Hajj Nabil Bishtawi, Dr. Musa al-Aqtam, who teaches at al-Najah University; and the engineer Zuhayr al-Libdah. From Ramallah, Shaykh Basim al-Jarrar, who serves as imam in the central mosque of al-Birah. A relatively large group of deportees came from Tulkarm and from Qalqilyah, where there is a lot of activity on the part of the religious institutions, and an Islamic college.

Among the deportees there are more who enjoy assistance from Iran than there are connected to Jordan and the oil countries. The assistance from Iran is relatively new and was promised to the military arm of Hamas to have it carry out terrorism that would hurt the peace process.

Membership in Hamas is not always clearly defined, so that the distinction between activists and sympathizers is blurred. That may be one of the causes for the mistakes that occurred in carrying out the mass detentions and the deportation. According to Palestinian sources about 70 detainees were released a few hours after they were arrested. Thirty-five of those initially targeted for deportation were removed from the lists at various stages of the preparations. Reporter Tahir Shritah from Gaza, for example, was returned from the Lebanese border before the buses crossed the border; Shritah is a writer for the Reuters news agency and well-known among foreign reporters in Israel, who applied heavy pressure for his release. He was arrested at the beginning of last week after he passed along to the news agencies the Hamas announcement that it was responsible for the firing upon an IDF [Israel Defense Forces] jeep in Hebron in which a reservist was killed.

After the initial shock of the deportation in the Palestinian camp, the first political activity to appear are attempts at a rapprochement between the PLO, whose activists are in distress, and Hamas. This tendency is even growing in the face of announcements by Israel that the strike against Hamas was intended, among other things, to help the Palestinian nationalist camp that supports the peace process.

#### Document on Settler 'Red Lines,' Autonomy Plan

93AE0233A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
1 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Nadav Shragai: "Document of the 'Autonomy Frustration Staff' Defines the Right's 'Limit of Obedience' to the Government"]

[Text] In the settlements, in the territories, and within the country proper, a sign-up campaign is being waged these days to a memorandum outlining both the limits of obedience by the rightwingers to the Rabin government and ways to oppose autonomy. The memorandum is addressed to the prime minister, Yitzhaq Rabin. The people behind the initiative are the staff of the Struggle for Revocation of the Autonomy Program, headed by Elyaqim Ha'etzni; Shlomo Baum, Brig. Gen. (Res.); Moshe Leshem, Me'ir Gross of Bet-El and Avraham Mintz, one of the founders of Alon-Moreh.

"Your Excellency, the prime minister," the memorandum writes, "this is the time to bring to your attention the position of a great many in Israel, not only that of the settlers within the territories. Red lines exist, the crossing of which will cause a historic split in the nation as in the days of Rehoboam, the son of Solomon—a rift the likes of which has not been seen since the beginning of the Zionist settlement. These are some of them:

1. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] cannot prevent the movement of Jews in places to be evacuated or their active self-defense against any attack.

2. The abolition of security legislation in the territories, a gesture such as the release of convicted terrorists and the granting of permission to PLO-Tunis people to enter the country—the inescapable result of which would be the intensification of the Intifadah. It is natural to expect that after the withdrawal of the army from the Arab centers, the Jews will defend themselves, their settlements, and the access routes to them and would even call upon the residents of Israel and the Jews of the diaspora to come to the assistance of the besieged.

### The Road to Lebanonization Is Not Long

3. The transfer of policing authority to the masked axe wielders ('the autonomy police')—it is only reasonable [to assume] that Israeli Jews will not obey them and will not recognize them. If an attempt is made to establish their 'authority' by force, there will be resistance by force. The road from here to 'Lebanon' is not long.

4. Uprooting of the Jewish settlement from the city of Hebron—if the rumor is true, it would mean [the massacre of the Jewish community of] 1929 all over again, this time at the hands of a Jewish government.

5. The destruction of small settlements in the territories, the 'transfer' of their inhabitants, their concentration in large Jewish enclaves—it would be 'ethnic cleansing' of Jews of the territories by a Jewish government. Like any other 'ethnic cleansing' this is a crime against humanity, against Judaism, and against Zionism. Its implementation by force would be absolutely illegal. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that, given such events, there could spring up a 1991-type Moscow syndrome, where thousands of demonstrators persuaded the soldiers of the Soviet Army to block the tanks and thus saved the rule of law.

6. The transfer of power over state lands to the PLO—the government has no mandate to turn over the country's land to foreigners. It can be expected that the Jewish settlers will not feel themselves obligated to accept a final position of Arab territorial siege that would confine them in ghettos.

7. The transfer of land registration and planning and construction authority to the PLO—such agreements would certainly not be binding upon Jewish settlers and settlements, and it is reasonable to suppose that they would not obey them.

8. Prevention of new Jewish construction on state lands—it can be expected that in reaction to such a suffocating edict the Jews would also move in the direction of 'free construction.' The Arabs build that way day and night, with or without permits. Certainly the IDF would have no trouble tearing down a particular house in Qiryat Arba', but finding and destroying hundreds of other 'free construction' sites throughout the territories would be no easy task. Carrying it out would poison the atmosphere within the army, the nation, and the country. A government in

Israel that implements such edicts would act like a foreign, hostile government; it would become a tool serving the interests of the PLO Arabs by responding to the pressure of Israeli Arabs, upon whose votes it depends.

9. Transfer of the holy places and archeological sites to the authority of 'PLO self-rule'—it is reasonable to expect that Jews would foil in the field any attempt to return them to the 'seventh step' of the Cave of the Patriarchs or to prevent them from visiting the Grave of Rachel, the Grave of Joseph, etc.

10. The transfer of the courts, licensing bureaus, all official registrations to the PLO—granting of such authorities would be considered null and void. If the Government of Israel were to cut off Jewish settlement in the territories from the state courts and registration, it would create two separate Jewish entities in the land of Israel. The people of Israel would not stand for that.

11. Forcing the Jewish inhabitants of the territories to use the PLO mail, telephone service, water, and electricity—the Jews will refuse to lick an Arafat stamp and will refuse any service of an Arab terrorist regime.

12. Granting the PLO permission to establish a radio and television broadcasting station—no longer from Tunis, but from now on the word of the Palestinian terrorist Torah would go forth from Zion. The Israeli Jews would demand their own broadcasting stations. If the Government of Israel should refuse them, the 'captive voice of Zion' would yet be heard from the hills of Judea and Efra'im.

13. The destruction of the environment. The transfer of authority in the field to the PLO—as the Arabs did for the hundreds of years when they ruled in Israel, they will destroy the environment and the quality of life. Friction would be unavoidable.

14. Involving the PLO in the control of the Jordan bridges, the entry of 400,000 Arabs who left the territories since 1967 together with their descendants, the entry of the 1948 refugees—such an immigration would physically seal off the Jewish future in the territories and would build a Palestinian state. The government would not be able to escape the people's judgment for broken promises and treason against the ideals of the state, the national heritage, and Zionism.

15. Applying budgetary pressure to force the Jewish population of the territories beyond the fence in order to encourage them to leave the area—the expected reaction: a direct appeal to the Jews of Israel and the world to send help to their brothers under double siege—with the PLO in front of them and being pushed from behind by an Israeli government under pressure from Arab MK's [members of Knesset] doing Arafat's bidding.

Your Excellency, the prime minister, the signers of this memorandum are convinced that the entire people, except for a handful of deviants, are alarmed at the possibility that a Jewish name, the name of Yitzhaq Rabin, might be added to the pair of names Nebuchadnezzar and Titus, those wicked people who exiled the Jews from Hebron, Shiloh, and Bet-El."

**Housing Ministry General Manager Profiled**

93AE0232B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
28 Dec 92 p 5

[Article by Ronit Entler: "The New General Manager: A Brilliant Man"]

[Text] Yosi Ginosar, 47, since yesterday the general manager of the construction and housing ministry and formerly a senior member of the Shin Bet, is considered a brilliant man. He was among the candidates for the job of head of the Shin Bet, but, following the Line 300 incident, was forced to resign after about 20 years of service.

In the Line 300 incident, the head of the Shin Bet appointed Ginosar the Shin Bet representative in the Zore'a commission that was set up to investigate the matter. In the end he won a pardon from the country's president.

His name was also mentioned in connection with the incident of the Cherkessian officer Izat Nafsu. In that incident, too, he was accused of falsifying evidence.

In December 1986 Ari'el Sharon, then Minister of Industry and Commerce, appointed him manager of the export institute. About a month later, in January 1987, Ginosar, who was unknown to the press, had his picture published for the first time.

After two years in the job of director of the export institute, he resigned from the job and moved on to private business.

In March 1991, when Ginosar was on a business trip to South Africa, his eldest son Shahar fell during a terrorist attack in Gaza. Ginosar, who had served many years in Gaza, called it then "a place of death."

After the death of his son, he appealed to the High Court of Justice to have Shahar of blessed memory's birthdate written on the tombstone in the secular version alongside the Hebrew date, and was successful.

Two weeks afterward, he showed up for work and called for withdrawal from Gaza. He joined a group of officers, among them Efra'im Sneh, Yanush ben-Gal and Uri Or, that drove around in a car between the Labor branches in the Knesset primaries.

Shortly before the elections, articles began appearing in the press calling on Labor ranks not to elect him to the Knesset because of his Shin Bet past. Since he was not elected, he was appointed by his confidant and friend, today Minister of Housing Binyamin (Fu'ad) ben-Eli'ezer, as chairman of the "Amidar" management council. Yesterday the government approved his appointment as general manager of the construction and housing ministry.

**Gen Yatom's Career Described**

93AE0232C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
21 Dec 92 p 23

[Article by Dani Sade: "Rabin Wants To Keep Him Close"]

[Text] A few days ago Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin turned to the general of the southern command, Dani Yatom, with a surprising request: I want you by my side, very close. I want you to be my military secretary, both as head of government and as Minister of Defense. Particularly at this time I need someone to coordinate all the work of the prime minister's office with the Mossad, the Shin Bet, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], the defense establishment and other bodies. You are the man, Rabin told Gen. Yatom.

The meeting between the two was held in a restricted, limited framework. Yatom did not hide his surprise. He felt complimented by the confidence the prime minister expressed in him. A military secretary with the rank of general, with wide authority, is rightfully considered a very senior position, especially at this time.

Rabin asked Yatom to decide as quickly as possible. He wanted the appointment to take effect immediately. Yatom came to grips with the idea and then made one request of Rabin: Let me finish up two years in the position of general of the central command. At this time I do not want to abandon ship. Rabin agreed to the request.

Even before the official publication of the appointment, interested parties began to meddle. One of them, connected to the defense establishment and is known for his hatred of Dani Yatom, began to spread rumors about Yatom's "removal" from his job.

He also tried to argue strongly that Yatom was the one who went to the prime minister and asked for the job, when he realized that in the next round of appointments he might well find himself running in place, or out.

The fact that both the IDF spokesman and the prime minister's office denied the slander did not prevent those schemers from continuing to spread it. No one would allow the facts to get in the way of a juicy story. By the way, according to the rumors we heard, the present appointment will actually serve him as a springboard for senior positions.

Dani Yatom, 47, from Netanya, has been serving as general of the central command since March 1991. He will leave that job precisely upon completion of two years to the day of the appointment. He was drafted into the IDF in 1963, to a general staff unit. For nine years he served in the unit in various command jobs.

Afterward he rotated into armor and filled a series of jobs, from commander of a tank command company to regular army brigade commander in the Sinai. In 1981 he was appointed chief of armored doctrine and a year later was appointed chief of the research and development unit.

He spent the next two years in the defense ministry, as the military secretary for Arens and Rabin. In 1985 he was

appointed commander of a regular armored task force and in 1987, chief of the planning branch of the IDF, a position in which he won much praise.

His next appointment was to the central command. There were other candidates for that job who were upset that Yatom got the position. Back then already the rumors began that he was chosen not because of talent but because of connections. Baraq, many claimed, advances his friends from the unit. The picture of the two of them on the wing of the hijacked Sabena airplane at Lod airport always had Yatom's face blacked out, so that over the years his part in the extrication of the plane's passengers could not be exposed.

His entry on board was accompanied, as well, by no little opposition within the central command. The new orders he issued and his overinsistence on procedures, order, and sticking to the goal did not sit well with a lot of officers. He was very hard-nosed with the officers, demanded standards they were not used to, and, especially, demanded honesty and fairness.

Yatom, and no one can take that away from him, is straight as a ruler or, as some of his close friends say, straight to the point of being square. There are no round corners with him, nothing with him is "approximately" or "perhaps something else." There is, and always is, just one way to achieve the goal, and that way is not blessed by any indirect means. The number of senior officers who were removed, suspended, or transferred from their jobs last year only emphasizes the extent to which he made sure no one would deviate from the lines he set down.

A number of months after coming on board, when the uprising had changed from disturbances with a large number of participants to terrorist activity by what was described in the IDF as the "hard core," Yatom proposed an expansion of the orders for opening fire as a way to save soldiers' lives. In tandem, he was for the punishment of deportation. The settlers in the territories had quite a number of complaints and requests for increasing security on the transportation axes in Judea and Samaria. Yatom, in accordance with General Staff instructions, was forced to cut his forces.

Upon his entry on board as general of the command, there were about 500 people wanted by the Shin Bet. Yatom institutionalized the connection between the army, the Shin Bet, and the civil administration. The cooperation helped the intelligence work. The results could be seen in the large number of wanted men that the IDF and the security agencies were able to put their hands on.

The wanted list today numbers about 100. Among those who were caught, about 150 turned themselves in. At a time when the numbers of forces were reduced, the IDF succeeded in lowering the level of street violence by 50 percent and the overall level of terrorist acts by a similar percentage. True, the intifadah changed course, and today there is more violent activity on the part of the wanted men, but estimates are that even in this area there will be a reduction.

A year and eight months on the job are not enough to draw conclusions. But it must be noted that Yatom institutionalized the Jordan Valley line; he improved the level of the units that carry out regular security along the border; the forces frustrated all attempts at attack from Jordan and, in addition, the central command succeeded in stabilizing the training curve, almost without interruption.

In March 1993 Gen. Yatom will report to the prime minister's office. Rabin does not require that he bring along a letter of recommendation or sympathetic articles in the press. Rabin saw the receipts in the field, and that is good justification for his decision to adopt him.

### **RPV Boost-Phase Intercept Capabilities**

*93WC0012Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
24 Dec 92 p B3*

[Article by Aluf Ben: "Over the Enemy's Head"]

[Text] A Ministry of Defense team has been conducting talks in the United States for about three weeks on a new development plan that Israel would carry out within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], a study to determine the possibility of intercepting ground-to-ground missiles with nonpiloted vehicles [RPVs] which would attack the missiles during the boost phase.

The new plan is less known than the Arrow missile project, and its budget is only \$6 million—in contrast to hundreds of millions for the Arrow. But they are saying in the defense establishment that its importance in the system for defending the country against attacks by ground-to-ground missiles is no less than that of the antimissile missile.

On 3 December, the SDI Administration issued a brief announcement in the Pentagon bulletin of requests for tenders: "It is our intention to develop contacts with the Israeli Ministry of Defense for the conduct of technical studies on advanced approaches for intercepting ballistic missiles in the boost phase.

"The administration seeks to benefit from unique data in the possession of Israel, which result from its experience in defending against missiles during wartime and in operating RPVs over hostile territory."

Defense experts assert that ground-to-ground missiles are especially vulnerable to interception in their boost phase, among other reasons because the missile takes off relatively slowly. Interception of the missile in the boost phase would prevent damage in Israel, and would also strengthen deterrence: hostile rulers would hesitate to launch a non-conventional missile if they knew that it was liable to explode over their heads.

The development of a remotely piloted vehicle that would attack the ascending missiles deep in enemy territory involves complex technological and operational problems. Considerable experience has been accumulated in Israel in the development of remotely piloted vehicles (in Israel Aircraft Industries) and in infrared-guided missiles (in Rafael). But in the defense establishment, it is believed that fat development contracts are not to be expected after the initial study.

The defense industry in the United States is mired in a severe crisis and in heavy competition between manufacturers, and will do everything in its power to prevent the transfer of work to other countries. The notice in the tender request bulletin was worded also in an apologetic tone: The work must be given to Israeli suppliers because of their unique know-how.

The proposal to develop an RPV to intercept missiles was already presented to the Americans six years ago, when General James Abramson, who then headed the SDI Administration, visited Israel and asked to review Israel's plans for defense against missiles.

The offensive RPV was perfectly suited to the Israeli defense conception, whose thrust is to take the war into the enemy's territory. Instead of waiting for the hostile missile and intercepting it before it strikes its target, it is possible to destroy it during the boost phase, over the launch area.

Abramson said then that the idea was interesting, but did not suit the defense concept of "Star Wars." An antimissile such as the Arrow, which is launched from friendly territory at the attacking Scud, seemed to suit the American doctrine. The United States agreed to finance the development of the Arrow, but there was no chance of getting a budget for a system that would attack the missiles in enemy territory.

At that time, President Ronald Reagan sat in the White House, and he wanted to develop a system to destroy the nuclear missiles that would be launched by "the evil Soviet empire." Defense against medium-range missiles ("theatre missiles" in American terminology) such as the Scud, held only a minor position in the order of priorities, at the top of which were missile interception sensors and satellites that would hover in space.

The Gulf War marked the change. The Scud and things similar to it then appeared as a real threat to the American forces that were to operate in diverse combat theatres. The SDI underwent a complete change, and the portion of the budget devoted to defense against theatre missiles grew. Along with the Arrow, the Americans began to develop their own antimissile missile, THAAD [theater high-altitude area interceptor], and to improve the interception capability of the Patriot missiles.

The approaching swearing-in of Bill Clinton heralds an additional change in the American defense conception. Clinton said during his election campaign that he intended to eliminate half the budget of the SDI over the next five years. The president-elect opposes the development plans for the space-based missile interception system, but has not yet clarified which components of the SDI he would retain.

Among the promises scattered by Clinton's campaign headquarters, it was stated that financing for the Arrow would continue. Before the election, the new secretary of defense, Les Aspin, who is also an enthusiastic supporter of strategic cooperation with Israel, declared his support for continued development of the Arrow with American financing.

The signs of change in American policy were discernible even before the presidential elections, in the congressional deliberations on the Pentagon budget for fiscal 1993 that began on 1 October this year. The Senate and the House of Representatives, with Democratic majorities, slashed the budget of the Strategic Defense Administration. From the \$5.4 billion that President Bush requested, only \$3.8 billion remained in the budget law, \$300 million less than in the '92 budget. The cut hit mainly the space defense systems, and not the plans for defense from theatre missiles.

In the farewell interview given by Henry Cooper, the outgoing chief of the Strategic Defense Administration, to the weekly DEFENSE NEWS, he said that Congress had sent a clear message. The defense from theatre missiles would occupy an important place in the development plans, against the background of the experience in the Gulf War and the growing fear of proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Cooper noted the plans for interception of missiles in their boost phase as among the main goals for his successors.

"Now the Americans are accepting the concepts that we presented to them several years ago, and they understand the danger inherent in missiles such as the Scud," they are saying in the defense establishment. "It is a shame to have lost years of development time."

From what has been published in professional literature abroad, it can be seen that the Israeli RPV plan will compete with similar proposals of American entities. At the top of the list is the "Rafter," an RPV that would be propelled by solar energy and would fly for an unlimited time at high altitude (65,000 feet).

The Rafter would be equipped with two long-range missiles called "Talon," and would defend a territory with a radius of 300 km. Scenarios carried out by the Strategic Defense Administration showed that four Rafter would defend the entire territory of Israel for a range of 600 km. Thirteen Rafter would defend Israel and the Gulf states from missiles launched from any point in Iraq.

The Pentagon requested \$43 million this year for an examination of the technological feasibility of the Rafter, and even hired a private company to build an experimental RPV. The Talon missiles are being developed in the "Lawrence Livermore" national laboratory, on the basis of technologies that were developed for the space defense system, whose budget was cut.

The Congress refused to approve the budget for the Rafter until the project was adopted by the branches of the American army, and it will not be managed by the SDI Administration, which is an independent office in the Pentagon.

The U.S. Air Force proposed the development of a system called ["Fragarin,"] which would launch long-range interceptor missiles from fighters and bombers at ascending ground-to-ground missiles. Other proposals were to install powerful laser weapons on RPVs or on large passenger aircraft.

Israeli experts say that the booster phase interception system cannot substitute for the Arrow missiles, but rather would complement them. It is difficult to maintain RPVs permanently over the enemy's territory in the expectation of a surprise attack. It is more reasonable that the RPVs would be launched only after a war had begun. And, in any event, there is a need for an efficient defense system in case the attacking Scud gets through the interceptor RPVs and continues on its flight towards the target.